ICGN welcomes the public consultation on the Code, as this allows for a broad range of perspectives, including from investors and other stakeholders, both inside and outside of France. However, we find it a limitation that the Code is “owned” by corporate representative bodies, to the exclusion of investor representation.

The International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN)は、会社法制（企業統治等関係）の見直しに関する中間試案に対し、意見書を提出いたします。（なお、この日本語の意見書は、同時に、提出させていただく英語版の意見書の要点を翻訳したものとなります。）

ICGN welcomes the revisions to Japan’s Companies Act under the auspices of the MoJ. As the world’s third largest capital market, with substantial overseas foreign investment, Japan is a very important market to ICGN members. 

The International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) is pleased to respond to the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEX) consultation paper (CP) on A Listing Regime for Companies from Emerging and Innovative Sectors.

ICGN’s CEO, Kerrie Waring, serves as a Member of the Council established by FSA to advise on Japan’s Corporate Governance and Stewardship Codes. Our latest letter provides comment on new FSA Guidance on Company and Investor Engagement focused on capital allocation, CEO appointment / dismissal, role of Independent Directors, remuneration, audit committee responsibilities and cross shareholdings.

The International Corporate Governance Network is pleased to respond to the Monetary Authority of Singapore consultation on the Recommendations of the Corporate Council with regard to the Singapore Corporate Governance Code

ICGN is presenting the draft Guidance on the Implications of Fiduciary Duty for Institutional Investors for member consultation and comment. We would welcome any member feedback on this document by 31 March 2018. 

To keep the Code fresh and effective in promoting good corporate governance, it is appropriate to periodically consider revisions to the Code. On the whole, we welcome the reduction of Principles and Provisions in the new Code, and believe the attention given to stakeholder relations as a matter of corporate governance is appropriate.

ICGN's latest viewpoint considers the technical factors that institutional investors may wish to take into account when planning and implementing an exclusion policy for their investments. 

We are writing to express our members’ concern that the SEC is reportedly considering a substantial policy change to allow companies to add mandatory arbitration clauses to their organic documents. We would interpret this as working against the rights and interests of minority shareholders.

ICGN support's the initiative of the Monitoring Group to seek wide stakeholder representation in this important review in this consultation, and we believe in particular that an investor perspective is important for these deliberations—and for the future oversight of the Public Interest Oversight Board’s (PIOB’s) activities.

It is clear that sustainability factors can have important influences on the long-term value creation of companies, and, taking a systemic perspective, these factors can also affect financial markets and economies in a macro context therefore ICGN is pleased to respond to this consultation. 

ICGN recognises the important role played by shareholder voting research and many, if not most, of our investor members make use of some external voting research service. The BPP serve as a healthy discipline and as a positive external signal to the financial community – including both investors and issuers—that shareholder voting research is conducted under agreed professional standards. 

ICGN welcomes investors to endorse the ICGN Global Stewardship Principles to signify their commitment to high standards of investor stewardship practices. Read the letter of invitation for more information.

ICGN issues a new Viewpoint following on from our February Viewpoint on differential ownership structures. We note that positive developments have been made in addressing the concerns about multiclass shares in benchmark indices, however we believe that the changes announced thus far could have gone further in protecting investors from differential ownership in benchmark indices.